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

The interplay of gender and perceived sexual orientation at the bargaining table: A social dominance and intersectionalist perspective

Sreedhari D. Desai [a,*], Brian C. Gunia [b]

[a] Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States
[b] Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21202, United States

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ABSTRACT

Prior research suggests that female negotiators often obtain worse outcomes than male negotiators. The current research examines whether this pattern extends to the large subset of men and women who identify as gays and lesbians. In particular, we interweave scholarship on gender stereotypes with work on intersectionality and MOSAIC theory to develop a theoretical model that anticipates how male and female negotiators will be treated at the bargaining table based on whether they are perceived to be heterosexual or homosexual. This model predicts that homosexual women, like heterosexual men, will receive more beneficial negotiation offers and outcomes than heterosexual women and homosexual men. Additionally, it suggests that this will happen because people hold markedly different behavioral expectations for male and female heterosexual and homosexual negotiators. The results of five experimental and audit studies involving diverse samples of participants including Masters Students in the U.S. and India, individuals selling items on Craigslist, and street vendors in India provide robust support. Collectively, these findings highlight the importance of considering gender and sexual orientation in tandem when studying negotiation.

1. Introduction

Negotiations play a vital role in shaping social and organizational life. As a few examples, people negotiate to distribute and exchange valued resources (Thompson, 1990), develop consensus about organizational goals (Bazerman et al., 1990; Brett, Goldberg, & Ury, 1990), and acquire power (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Given the prominence of gender in people's interpersonal perceptions (Eagly & Sczesny, 2009; Heilman, 2012; Hentschel, Heilman, & Peus, 2019), research has long examined the influence of gender on negotiation outcomes (see Kray & Thompson, 2005 for review). Despite some mixed results, a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that, on average, female negotiators tend to receive worse economic outcomes than male negotiators (Mazei et al., 2015).

Gender differences in negotiation may trace at least in part to the prevalence of androcentric ideologies and associated beliefs (e.g., Bem, 1993; Eagly, 1987; Miles & Clenney, 2010), which involve perceiving men as the prototypical and dominant social group, and women as an atypical and subordinate social group.[1] As a result, people often apply specific stereotypes to men and women. Notably for negotiation, they often stereotype men as agentic and competitive, and women as passive and cooperative. These stereotypes, in turn, lead people to expect more passive negotiation behavior from female than male counterparts and to offer fewer concessions to women than men, ultimately resulting in worse outcomes for women than men (Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, & Maximiano, 2015; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Dittrich, Knabe, & Leipold, 2014; Hernandez-Arenaz & Iriberri, 2018).

Based on findings like these, the negotiation literature has tended to conclude that, on average, men outperform women in negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). In addition to androcentric ideologies, however, people also hold heterocentric ideologies, which involve perceiving heterosexual individuals as the prototypical and dominant social group, and homosexual individuals as an atypical and subordinate social group (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Interestingly, the negotiation literature has not yet examined whether and how perceived sexual orientation might influence the general negotiating advantage of men. This issue is notable for two reasons—one theoretical and one practical. On the theoretical side, research on intersecting identities (e.g., intersectional invisibility theory) suggests that the intersecting social category of sexual orientation alters people's foundational, gender-based

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: sreedharidesai@gmail.com (S.D. Desai).

[1] Note that, in describing the stereotypes documented in the literature, the authors are not endorsing or in any way agreeing with these stereotypes.

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stereotypes and behavior (Hall, Hall, Galinsky, & Phillips, 2019; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). That is, people apply different stereotypes to and use different behavior with men and women who do not fit the category of heterosexual. Thus, examining the role of perceived sexual orientation by drawing from work on intersecting identities could qualify any negotiating advantage of men. On the practical side, some nine million U.S. adults publicly identify as homosexual, and many more presumably identify privately (Burns, Barton, & Kerby, 2012; Mallory, 2020). Examining perceived sexual orientation facilitates a more complete understanding of real negotiators' behavior and outcomes.

The current research integrates work on intersecting identities with social role, status characteristics, and negotiation theories to examine whether perceived sexual orientation moderates the general tendency of men to outperform women in distributive negotiations. Of note, our focus is *perceived* rather than actual sexual orientation, as a person's actual sexual orientation is less observable than their gender (Cox, Devine, Bischmann, & Hyde, 2016). Although the general population, media, and some researchers tend to lump lesbian women and gay men into the monolithic category of "homosexual," and despite negative attitudes towards homosexuals of *both* genders (Herek, 1996; Yang, 1997), we consider it critical to examine them separately because of the complexity and variability in stereotypes of lesbians versus gay men.

In particular, we examine the negotiation outcomes of both lesbian women and gay men (as well as heterosexual men and women) by building from the intersectional invisibility literature's insight that individuals generally fail "to fully recognize people with intersecting identities as members of their constituent groups" (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008: 381). In other words, individuals whose subordinated foundational identity (woman) intersects with another subordinated identity (homosexual) are less likely to be fully recognized as prototypical women or elicit the types of disadvantageous stereotypes or behaviors typically applied to women. To the extent that prototypical female negotiators are stereotyped as passive and thus elicit fewer concessions (i.e., smaller discounts from an initial offer) and thus worse outcomes, homosexual female negotiators (i.e., lesbian women) should elicit fewer such stereotypes and larger discounts, resulting in more favorable outcomes as compared to heterosexual women.

What about homosexual male negotiators (i.e., gay men)? Unlike lesbian women, who belong to the subordinated foundational category of woman, gay men belong to the dominant foundational category of man. Although intersectional invisibility theory tends to focus on groups seen as subordinate rather than dominant, its basic insight—that intersecting identities alter gender-based stereotypes and behaviors—may still apply (Ramarajan, 2014). In this case, the theory suggests that individuals whose dominant foundational identity (man) intersects with a subordinated identity (homosexual) are less likely to be fully recognized as prototypical men or elicit the types of *advantageous* stereotypes and behaviors typically applied to men. To the extent that prototypical male negotiators are stereotyped as agentic and thus elicit weak offers that result in superior outcomes, gay men should elicit fewer such stereotypes and smaller discounts, resulting in less favorable outcomes, as compared to heterosexual men. Though consistent with the logic of intersectional invisibility theory, this prediction may help extend the theory to dominant social groups such as men and heterosexuals.

In sum, we predict that sexual orientation will moderate the general, documented negotiating advantage of men, such that this effect holds for neither (perceived) lesbians nor (perceived) gay men. Specifically, despite the existing literature's suggestion that straight men outperform straight women, we predict that gay men will not experience such an advantage (i.e., they will perform less well than straight men), nor will lesbian women experience such a disadvantage (i.e., they will perform better than straight women), thereby ameliorating the documented gender effect. To test our predictions, we employ a multi-method research strategy. First, we conduct an experiment involving a face-to-face negotiation during a diversity event in an MBA program. Next, we run a large-scale audit study in an online market (Craigslist) within the U.S., manipulating the gender and perceived sexual orientation of buyers via their email signatures. Third, we conduct an experiment in which Masters students at a business school act as sellers of a used camera on Craigslist and negotiate with a potential buyer. In addition to replicating the moderating effect of sexual orientation on outcomes, this study examines the hypothesized mechanism, dominance perceptions. Fourth, we replicate Study 3′s findings in a non-U.S. context (India), using a different manipulation of homosexuality. Fifth and finally, we conduct a face-to-face audit study in an open bazaar in India and find largely consistent results.

We believe this paper makes four important theoretical and one important practical contribution. First, by examining the interactive effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation behaviors and outcomes, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between gender and negotiation. In particular, we expand on prior research focusing on heterosexual men and women by examining whether the findings extend to homosexual men and women. Second, whereas much organizational scholarship on diversity in the workplace has focused on relatively observable social identities such as age, race, and gender (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), we join the growing body of organizational scholars who are investigating the workplace dynamics of a less visible social identity: sexual orientation (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Leigh & Desai, 2022; Mohr et al., 2019; Ragins, Singh, & Cornwell, 2007; Rule, Bjornsdottir, Tskhay, & Ambady, 2016; Tilcsik, 2011). Third, our work demonstrates the importance of investigating how multiple, intersecting identities influence negotiations. While studies have investigated the influence of intersectionality on leadership, teams, and job selection (Hill & Gunderson, 2015; Rosette, Koval, Ma, & Livingston, 2016), no known research has examined this ubiquitous and important issue in the negotiation context. Fourth, our research offers the intriguing suggestion that belonging to two subordinated, or marginalized, social identity groups (Biernat & Sesko, 2013; Sesko & Biernat, 2010; e.g., woman and homosexual) may actually help people at the bargaining table. Some previous research in non-negotiation contexts maintains that homosexual women face double jeopardy—both sexism and social exclusion for their sexual preferences—as a result of membership in two marginalized social groups (Bell Smith & Nkomo, 2001). However, by demonstrating a relative bargaining advantage for lesbian women, we extend nascent work linking membership in two subordinated identity groups to positive outcomes (Biernat & Sesko, 2013). Finally, our paper holds important implications for negotiation practitioners and educators focused on issues of gender and/or sexual orientation.

2. Androcentric ideologies in negotiation context

Even though men and women comprise nearly equal percentages of the general population (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019), 2019), research suggests that when people think of the default and/or dominant social group, they predominantly think of men (Bailey & LaFrance, 2016; Hamilton, 1991). This phenomenon is called androcentrism (Bem, 1993; Sczesny, Formanowicz, & Moser, 2016; Sczesny, Moser, & Wood, 2015). Though subtle, androcentrism is thought to significantly influence stereotypes and behavior, in general and in the context of negotiations.

Two prominent theories—social role theory (Eagly, 1987) and status characteristics theory (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1966; Wagner & Berger, 1997)—help to explain the sources of androcentric ideologies and the types of stereotypes and behavior they elicit. Social role theory posits that gender roles (i.e., societal expectations of men and women) took hold over many centuries (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Because men have historically occupied independent roles requiring them to master their environment, male gender roles have developed to include agentic qualities such as competitiveness and assertiveness (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). By comparison, women have historically occupied collective roles involving the nurturing and raising

of children; consequently, female gender roles have developed to include passive qualities such as cooperativeness and warmth (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). In accordance with historical developments, current gender stereotypes, which often arise unconsciously, tend to paint men as agentic and competitive, and women as passive and cooperative (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Furthermore, men and women are expected to behave in line with these stereotypes (Eagly & Wood, 1999; Eagly, 1987; Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Status characteristics theory focuses less on historical roles and more on present perceptions. This theory posits that people observe the behavior of social actors in everyday interactional contexts. If they witness members of one group wielding higher-status positions than members of a different group, they start to believe that the former group is more competent and assertive in obtaining successful outcomes (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972). As people start to share such beliefs, group stereotypes arise. Since men often occupy higher-status positions than women in modern society (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), status characteristics theory suggests that perceivers generally ascribe more competence, assertiveness, and dominance to men based on their observations.

Together, social role and status characteristic theories highlight the androcentric belief that men are the prototypical and dominant social group. Further, these theories highlight some specific stereotypes people apply to men and women based on this androcentric belief. Notably for negotiation, they stereotype men as dominant and competitive, whereas they stereotype women as passive and cooperative. These stereotypes, in turn, are thought to influence negotiation behavior through mismatching (Pruitt & Syna, 1985): a process by which negotiators put pressure on counterparts they consider cooperative or passive and make less aggressive demands of counterparts they consider domineering (Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982).

Fundamentally, mismatching occurs because individuals who expect their negotiation counterpart to be cooperative or passive see their own aggressive demands as less likely to elicit impasse and thus, as less risky. Seeing negotiation as a zero-sum game, these individuals thus act more competitively and aggressively toward a counterpart seen as cooperative or passive, which results in better outcomes for them and worse outcomes for the counterpart. In contrast, when individuals expect a counterpart to act in a domineering or aggressive fashion (Lee, Chang, & Lee, 2000), they perceive their own competitive maneuvers as risky. Thus, these individuals tend to act more cooperatively and make numerous concessions toward a domineering counterpart, which results in worse outcomes for them and better outcomes for the counterpart. Several studies have documented the tendency to mismatch a counterpart's negotiation behavior (e.g., De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van De Vliert, 1994; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Mismatching is one important reason (albeit not the only reason) why men may perform better than women in negotiation, on average (e.g., Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, & Magan, 2004; Bowles et al., 2007; Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Holm, 2000; Houser & Schunk, 2009). Thus, we generally expect to replicate a gender difference between men and women. For reasons described next, however, we only expect to replicate that pattern for straight men and straight women—a qualification that may help to explain the relatively weak meta-analytical evidence in favor of men in general (Mazei et al., 2015). Thus, we predict:

Hypothesis 1. In general, straight women receive less favorable negotiation offers and achieve less favorable outcomes as compared to straight men.

3. Heterocentricism, intersectional invisibility, and negotiation

In addition to androcentric ideologies, people also are thought to hold heterocentric ideologies, which indicate that heterosexuals are the prototypical and dominant social group, whereas homosexuals represent an atypical and subordinated group (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Despite the obvious intersection between sexual orientation and gender, extant research on gender differences in negotiation has focused on tracing the effects of androcentrism, to the exclusion of heterocentrism. In other words, studies have not yet examined the potentially important moderating role of sexual orientation. In contrast to a relatively monolithic view of women and men, increasing evidence suggests that people hold fundamentally different expectations for homosexual vs. heterosexual women and men. Work on intersecting identities grounded in both MOSAIC theory and intersectional invisibility theory aids in understanding these differences.

MOSAIC theory, from the management literature, proposes that evaluators categorize individuals into foundational categories (e.g., woman), less foundational intersecting categories (e.g., homosexual), and other cognitively associated categories (Collins, 2015; Collins, 2000; Hall et al., 2019; Maddox & Gray, 2002). Foundational categories are those perceived most readily and most frequently—one being gender. Since each type of category comes with stereotypes, MOSAIC theory helps to explain how additional social categories influence what individuals expect from, and how they act toward others. For example, when an evaluator perceives a person as belonging to the foundational category of woman, they assess that person's behavior against associated stereotypes such as passivity and cooperativeness (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2018; Maddox, 2004). Importantly, however, the evaluator may then adjust their expectations for perceived membership in other intersecting categories such as homosexual. Thus, MOSAIC theory suggests that gender stereotypes and associated behaviors may vary across women or men who differ in intersecting social categories such as sexual orientation (Collins, 2000, 2015), with foundational category stereotypes applying most strongly to individuals perceived as most prototypical of a given category (i.e., heterosexual men and women; Hall et al., 2019; Maddox & Gray, 2002).

Similarly, intersectional invisibility theory recognizes that people concurrently possess multiple social identities (based on gender, sexuality, race, class, etc.) that differ in terms of associated perks and power. Furthermore, these social identities are not independent or mutually exclusive but intersecting, and intersecting categories can interact in complex ways that alter foundational, gender-based stereotypes and behavior (Collins, 2000, 2015; Hall et al., 2019). Most provocatively, this theory suggests that individuals often fail "to fully recognize people with intersecting identities as members of their constituent groups" (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008: 381). In other words, this theory holds that individuals whose subordinated foundational identity (woman) intersects with another subordinated identity (homosexual) are less likely to be fully recognized as prototypical women or elicit the types of disadvantageous stereotypes or behaviors typically applied to women (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Rosette et al., 2016). In this sense, "possessing multiple subordinate-group identities can render people 'invisible' relative to those with a single [subordinated]-group identity" (Rosette et al., 2016: 6).

Taken together, MOSAIC theory and intersectional invisibility theory suggest, first, that lesbian women may have a unique advantage (relative to heterosexual women) at the bargaining table. MOSAIC theory suggests that perceivers are likely to adjust foundational, gender-based stereotypes of women as passive and cooperative for their membership in the intersecting category of homosexual. Specifically, this intersecting category may lead perceivers to see lesbian women as relatively more agentic and competitive than heterosexual women (Collins, 2000; Donovan, 2011; Koenig, 2018). Similarly, intersectional invisibility theory suggests that lesbian women are less likely to be recognized as prototypical (heterosexual) women or elicit the associated stereotypes. Thus, perceivers should be less likely to stereotype lesbian women as passive and cooperative. As a result of the mismatching processes described earlier, they should then be more likely to discount their offers to lesbian than heterosexual women, resulting in superior outcomes for the former. In sum, work on MOSAIC theory, intersectional invisibility

theory, and mismatching in negotiation combine to suggest that lesbian women may have an advantage at the bargaining table, as compared to heterosexual women.

A parallel set of arguments may apply to homosexual men. MOSAIC theory suggests that perceivers are likely to adjust foundational, gender-based stereotypes of men as agentic and competitive for their membership in the intersecting category of homosexual. Specifically, this intersecting category may lead perceivers to see gay men as relatively more passive and cooperative than heterosexual men (Collins, 2000; Donovan, 2011; Koenig, 2018). Indeed, homosexual men are often perceived to have some of these traits (Connell, 2005; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; Jackson & Sullivan, 1989; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997; Page & Yee, 1986). On the surface, intersectional invisibility theory is harder to apply, as it typically focuses on individuals with multiple subordinated identities—not individuals with a dominant social category such as man. Still, the basic logic applies: Because gay men do not fit the prototypical profile of the category "man," perceivers may fail to fully categorize them as such or apply the associated gender-based stereotypes and behaviors. In this case, an intersection between the dominant foundational identity of man with the subordinated identity of homosexual is likely to suppress the types of *advantageous* stereotypes and behaviors typically applied to men. In other words, perceivers should be less likely to stereotype gay men as agentic and competitive. As a result of mismatching processes, they should then be less likely to discount their offers to gay than heterosexual men, resulting in worse outcomes for the former. In sum, MOSAIC theory, intersectional invisibility theory, and mismatching in negotiation combine to suggest that gay men may have a disadvantage in negotiation, as compared to heterosexual men.

4. The mediating role of dominance

The arguments above converge to suggest that a potential negotiating advantage (disadvantage) experienced by lesbian women (gay men) may be attributable to differing perceptions of dominance. Dominance is a pattern of behavior marked by aggression and control oriented toward victory over others (Rosette et al., 2016; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). As such, it represents an umbrella construct encompassing the more granular stereotypical perceptions of (heterosexual) male negotiators mentioned above such as competitive and aggressive (Fiske et al., 2002). Likewise, it stands in contrast to the more granular stereotypical perceptions of (heterosexual) female negotiators such as cooperative and passive (Bodenhausen, Kang, & Peery, 2012). Here, we rely on the umbrella construct of dominance rather than the more granular perceptions above, as it offers a bridge between negotiation theory and societal perceptions of men and women.

Specifically, evidence suggests that dominance perceptions directly impact negotiations. According to status characteristics theory, dominant negotiators are seen as more effective (Miles & Clenney, 2010; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), and individuals who view their negotiation counterparts as dominant are more likely to discount their initial offers and ultimately accept unfavorable counteroffers (Chertkoff & Baird, 1971; Lee et al., 2000; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). Such observations are in line with our understanding of social hierarchy, which suggests that dominant, higher-status individuals have more influence and access to resources.

Both gender and sexual orientation can influence perceptions of dominance (Bowles et al., 2007; Koenig & Eagly, 2014; Rosette et al., 2016; Rudman et al., 2012), and dominant groups may have a negotiation advantage (Eagly, 1987). For example, research on gender and negotiation consistently attributes the negotiating advantage of heterosexual men over heterosexual women to perceptions of dominance (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Indeed, dominance is prescribed or expected of straight men but proscribed and unexpected of straight women (Eagly, 1987; Fiske et al., 2002), and straight women who do show dominance may even be punished (Bowles et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998). Thus, dominance perceptions contribute to the documented negotiating advantage of heterosexual men vs. heterosexual women.

Stereotypical expectations for lesbian women and straight women differ, with lesbian women viewed as more dominant (Blashill & Powlishta, 2009; Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004). Thus, we would expect lesbian women not to be punished as readily for dominant behavior in negotiations, and perhaps to be rewarded (Rudman, 1998). Supporting this view, one study showed that lesbian women leaders were not punished for dominant behavior, whereas straight women and gay men leaders were (Wang, Steffensen, Perrewé, Ferris, & Jordan, 2021). We summarize the mechanism underlying the negotiation outcome differences above by proposing that stereotypes of lesbian women as relatively dominant will help to explain their outcome advantage relative to straight women. Similarly, since gay men are seen as relatively less dominant than straight men (Hall et al., 2019; Hernandez, Avery, Volpone, & Kaiser, 2018; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008), reduced perceptions of dominance may help to explain a negotiating disadvantage of gay vs. straight men. We do not make any specific predictions comparing lesbian women's negotiation outcomes to those of straight men, as we expect both groups to be viewed as relatively dominant. More formally, we present the following hypotheses as well as the overall theoretical model in Fig. 1.0:

Hypothesis 2. A two-way interaction between sexual orientation and gender indicates that lesbian women receive more favorable negotiation offers and outcomes than straight women, whereas gay men receive less favorable negotiation offers and outcomes than straight men.

Hypothesis 3. Lesbian women will be perceived as more dominant than straight women, whereas gay men will be perceived as less dominant than straight men. These differences in perceived dominance will explain the two-way interaction between sexual orientation and gender.

4.1. The current research

To test the hypotheses, we conduct six studies using multiple methods. First, we present a pilot study establishing that the prototypical negotiator is assumed to be male and that the prototypical male or female negotiators are assumed to be straight. Next, Study 1 explores the interactive effects of gender and sexuality on negotiation outcomes using a face-to-face negotiation exercise that captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiations. Study 2 seeks to establish external validity through an audit study (a type of field experiment) that manipulates the gender and sexuality of target negotiators in real-world negotiations on Craigslist.org. Specifically, confederate buyers contacted sellers of various items, and we documented variance in concessions as a function of gender and sexual orientation. Study 3 is a scenario-based experiment that examines the effects of gender and homosexuality on negotiation offers as well as the predicted mechanism, dominance perceptions. Study 4 seeks to replicate Study 3's findings in a



Fig. 1.0. Proposed theoretical model explaining the effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation offers and outcomes via perceived dominance.

non-U.S. (Indian) sample and a different manipulation of homosexuality, with both Study 3 and Study 4 focusing on internal validity. Finally, Study 5 seeks to overcome one of the challenges of Study 2 (i.e., that online audit studies may suffer from non-response bias) and extend our work in several other ways using a face-to-face field experiment in a southern Indian bazaar. Overall, the results support our hypotheses, though several mixed results are noted.

All data are available at osf.io/5d2nb.

4.2. Pilot study: Invisibility

As a backdrop for our main studies, we sought to validate our assumptions that the prototypical negotiator is assumed to be male, and the prototypical male or female negotiators are seen as heterosexual. To that end, individuals from Prolific Academic were asked to describe a prototypical negotiator, male negotiator, or female negotiator, then respond to some questions. We also checked the validity of their responses by reading their descriptions.

4.3. Sample and procedure

Sample. We sought to recruit 300 participants from Prolific Academic but ended up with 296 (32.4 % male, 67.6 % female; *M* age = 37.4 years, *SD* = 13.7 years; 28.7 % straight men, 52.4 % straight women, 1.0 % gay men, 2.0 % lesbian women, 11.5 % bisexual, 4.3 % other).

Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Prototypical negotiator, prototypical male negotiator, or prototypical female negotiator.

Procedure. Depending on condition, participants were asked to write a paragraph describing a "prototypical negotiator," "prototypical male negotiator," or "prototypical female negotiator." They were instructed to offer as many details as they could, including what this person might do, their name, interests, personal life, etc. After participants had provided an open-ended response, a subsequent screen asked whether they had written about a man or woman and whether they had written about a straight man, gay man, straight woman, or lesbian woman. Participants in all conditions concluded by answering a set of demographic questions.

5. Results and discussion

Table 1.0 lists the results by condition. Consistent with androcentric assumptions, most participants in the Prototypical negotiator condition (~79 %) indicated that they had written about a male (significantly different from 50 %; $t(97) = 6.86$, $p < 0.001$). Consistent with heterocentric assumptions, 95 % also indicated that they wrote about a straight individual—either a male (~77 %) or a female (18 %; with 95 % significantly differing from 50 %; $t(97) = 20.10$, $p < 0.001$). Likewise, and further consistent with heterocentric assumptions, all but one participant in the Prototypical male negotiator condition (99 %) indicated that they wrote about a straight male (significantly different from 50 %; $t(99) = 49.00$, $p < 0.001$), and most participants in the Prototypical female negotiator condition indicated that they wrote about a straight female (94 %; significantly different from 50 %; $t(97) = 18.03$, $p < 0.001$). A review of participants' open-ended responses was consistent with these responses, with participants in the Prototypical negotiator and Prototypical male negotiator conditions using stereotypically male names (e.g., "Bill," "Justin") and referring to female partners (e.g., "wife," "girlfriend"). Likewise, participants in the Prototypical female negotiator condition consistently used stereotypically female names (e.g., "Sharon," "Kate") and referred to male partners (e.g., "husband," "boyfriend").

Table 1.0
Results from the pilot study.

Condition	Wrote About (%)					
	Male	Female	Straight male	Gay male	Straight female	Lesbian female
Prototypical negotiator	78.57	21.43	76.53	4.08	18.37	1.02
Prototypical male negotiator	99.00	1.00	99.00	–	1.00	–
Prototypical female negotiator	–	100.00	–	–	93.88	6.12

This study supports our assumption that people tend to see the prototypical negotiator as both male and straight. In the cases when respondents spontaneously thought of a female negotiator or were prompted to do so, they tended to assume she was straight as well. Because the participant sample was largely straight and people tend to use their ingroup as a reference, one might consider these results an artifact. However, there was a larger percentage of self-reported LGBT individuals in this study than in U.S. society as a whole, so we consider the results broadly representative. If so, then consistent with our reasoning, traditional negotiation stereotypes may apply less readily to gay men or lesbian women.

5.1. Study 1: Face-to-face negotiation exercise during diversity weekend

One of the challenges with conducting LGBT research is that this group has historically been hard to reach, especially in business schools (Gatlin & Johnson, 2017). Luckily, we were able to leverage several diversity events at a major business school wherein many members of the LGBT community visited campus. These diversity events aimed to provide aspiring MBAs an opportunity to attend educational panels, interact with alumni and students, and learn about the application process. Importantly, prospective students who were not members of underrepresented groups but wished to share and uphold a school's diversity mission could also attend and participate in a "day in the life of an MBA student," and the current study includes some current MBA students likely to be straight. This all makes our hypothesis tests conservative in the sense that individuals perceived as members of the LGBT community due to the nature of the events may not have been.

This study examined behavior toward perceived members of the LGBT community (as opposed to the common reliance on confederates), in a face-to-face negotiation experiment. We predicted a pattern supporting H1-2. Due to the in-class nature of this study, we were only able to collect final sale prices, which function as the dependent variable. Extant research shows that initial offers have an anchoring effect such that higher first offers typically produce higher counteroffers and higher final agreements (Foreman & Murnighan, 1996; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Maaravi, Ganzach, & Pazy, 2011; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Thus, higher final prices would provide reasonable grounds to suspect higher initial offers (for example).

5.2. Sample and Procedure

Sample. Participants were 517 current or prospective Master of Business Administration Students (66.3 % male, 33.3 % female, 0.4 % other; 63.6 % heterosexual, 36.43 % homosexual; *M* age = 28 years, *SD* = 3.55 years). Current students were enrolled in a negotiation course at a large U.S. public university, and the study took place on the first day of their course. Prospective students were visiting campus as part of diversity events, and they participated in the current students' first negotiation class session.

Design. Participants were grouped into 258 dyads[2] and participated in a face-to-face negotiation. The set of current students was larger (*n* =

[2] One dyad had two students in the role of the buyer because of the odd number of students.

337) and contained 5 students identifying themselves as homosexual, whereas 89 (~50 %) of the 180 prospective students had identified themselves as homosexual in their application forms, and the rest had reported themselves as either belonging to other underrepresented minority groups or simply being supportive of the school's diversity mission. Accordingly, we populated the buyer role entirely with current students and the seller role with all of the prospective students plus the remaining current students. Note that neither current students nor prospective students had any explicit means of knowing whether their counterpart identified as gay or lesbian. We focused on the negotiation outcome as a function of the seller's gender and self-reported sexual orientation. As noted, this design represents a conservative test. In sum, the study had a 2(Seller gender: Male or female) × 2(Seller sexual orientation: Heterosexual or homosexual) between-subjects factorial design.

Procedure. Participants read a distributive negotiation case involving the sale of a pharmaceutical plant adapted from prior research (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Both the buyer and the seller read the same background information. Participants assigned to the buyer role then learned that they would act as the Chief Financial Officer of a company seeking a new plant to manufacture a line of highly specialized compounds. Since the company's existing plants could not be modified for this purpose, buyers learned that their best alternative was to build a new plant, which would cost $0.5 million for the land and $25 million for the building but take 12 months to complete (costing $1 million per month). Thus, their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) was valued at approximately $37.5 million. Sellers were told that they would act as the Chief Financial Officer of a company that was phasing out the product line at the plant. Since the plant was not readily usable for another purpose, their BATNA was to sell the plant and equipment separately, for a projected profit of $7 million, minus severance expenses of $1 million.

After reading their case materials, each participant was randomly assigned to a counterpart in the other role. They had thirty minutes to negotiate, after which they were asked to report the final price (our dependent variable). Finally, each participant completed various demographic questions including several about their gender and sexual orientation.

6. Results and discussion

There were no impasses, so all dyads were included in the analysis. As intended, all 129 buyers self-identified as heterosexual, whereas only 63.6 % of sellers did (with the remainder LGBT). To test H1-2, we conducted a factorial ANOVA with final price as the dependent variable and gender, sexual orientation, and their two-way interaction as the independent variables. The overall model was significant, $F(3,249)$ 16.89, $p < 0.001$, ω_p^2=0.16, as was the interaction between gender and sexual orientation, $F(1,249) = 35.63$, $p < 0.001$, ω_p^2=.12.[3] To understand the significance of the differences, multiple post hoc comparisons on the marginal means using the Bonferroni correction were conducted. These comparisons supported H1 in that straight women sellers received worse deals ($12.5 million) than straight men sellers ($18.2 million); $Diff = -5.707$, $SE = 0.879$, $p < 0.001$. They also supported H2 in that lesbian women achieved better deals ($17.9 million) than straight women, $Diff = 5.447$, $SE = 1.065$, $p < 0.001$, and gay men achieved worse deals ($14.8 million) than straight men, $Diff = -3.364$, $SE = 1.022$, $p = 0.007$. Although we had no hypothesis about the difference between lesbian women and gay men, we observed a marginally significant trend in favor of lesbian women, $Diff = 3.104$, $SE = 1.186$, $p = 0.056$. In sum, this study supported H1-2 by showing that heterosexual male and homosexual female negotiators outperformed heterosexual females or homosexual males (see Tables 1.1, 1.2, and Fig. 1.1).

6.1. Study 2: Online field experiment using craigslist in the U.S.

Study 1 provides supportive albeit initial evidence for the interactive effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation outcomes. However, the buyer and seller roles were confounded with sexuality to leverage the size of the available sample. Moreover, our reliance on a simulated negotiation may limit the generalizability of our results. Study 2 addresses these limitations through an audit study using a real online marketplace: Craigslist.

Audit studies, a type of field experiment, are considered the gold standard for studying preferences or discrimination in realistic economic contexts (e.g., Milkman, Akinola, & Chugh, 2015; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009). The audit study methodology combines the benefits of experimental research for establishing causality with the advantages of field studies for measuring real-world effects. In particular, whereas Study 1 required participants to negotiate with their counterparts, Study 2 examined behavior in Craigslist's open marketplace, in which participants can choose whether to negotiate.

Craigslist is a web-based marketplace that allows individuals to post classified advertisements for free (Worthen, 2013). Launched in 1995 as an email distribution list featuring events in San Francisco (Freese, 2011), Craigslist expanded in 2000 by creating online marketplaces for nine additional U.S. metropolitan areas (Worthen, 2013). Currently, more than 700 cities in 70 countries have their own Craigslist website, and more than 60 million people actively use these sites each month (Craigslist.org/about, n.d.). Each Craigslist website is designed to host advertisements from individuals who live in a specific geographic region, and is divided into separate sections containing classified advertisements for things such as housing, jobs, and items individuals wish to sell (Craigslist.org/about, n.d.).

Study 2 again examined the interactive effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation outcomes (H1-2). Our research assistants posed as confederate buyers on Craigslist, sending messages to individuals selling various items (e.g., antiques, appliances, bike parts, furniture, and electronics). We randomly varied the gender and sexual orientation of the confederate buyer. All messages asked sellers whether their original price was negotiable; we observed whether the seller made a counteroffer lower than their original price and how large the discount was. While the setting did not allow us to examine underlying mechanisms, we viewed its generalizability and realism as a useful complement to our other studies.

6.2. Sample and procedure

Sample. We sampled real sellers from Craigslist.com, randomly selecting eight states/territories in the US—California; Florida; Illinois; Washington, DC; Maryland; North Carolina; New York; and Washington State—and specifically targeted items on the "for sale" section of the website. In total, we targeted 720 ads. Several research assistants were trained to browse these listings and select only sellers who met the following criteria: 1) selling a used item with little or no damage; 2) not

Table 1.1
Predictive marginal means of final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 1).

	Margin	Std. Err.
Gender × Sexual orientation		
Straight male	18.17	0.62
Gay male	14.80	0.81
Straight female	12.46	0.62
Lesbian female	17.91	0.87
Grand	15.64	0.35

[3] A supplemental analysis with the buyer's gender included as a factor produced no significant effects involving buyer gender (p = 0.949), suggesting that it did not act as a moderator.

Table 1.2
Post-hoc comparisons of the predictive marginal means of the final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 1).

	Contrast [95 % Conf. Int.]	Std. error	t	p-value
Gender × Sexual orientation				
(Gay male) vs (Straight male)	−3.36 [−6.08, −0.65]	1.02	−3.29	0.007
(Straight female) vs (Straight male)	−5.71 [−8.05, −3.37]	0.88	−6.49	<0.001
(Lesbian Female) vs (Straight Female)	5.45 [2.62, 8.28]	1.07	5.11	<0.001

Bonferroni correction was applied to control for multiple comparisons; statistics reports are the Bonferroni 95 % confidence interval, t-statistic, and p-value.

part of a formal business; 3) selling only a single item; 4) not requesting a phone call or text; 5) not declaring that their price was non-negotiable; 6) recently posted their ad (as older advertisements often represent sold items with undeleted ads); and 7) listed their item at a price between $100 and $400 (to prevent outlier prices from potentially biasing our results; Acolin, Bostic, & Painter, 2016). When the volume of new listings fell short of the number needed for testing, advertisements were randomly drawn from older listings.

Design. This study used a 2(Gender: Male or female) × 2(Sexual orientation: Heterosexual or homosexual) between-subjects factorial design.

Procedure. Our research assistants, who were blind to our theoretical model, first navigated to relevant local Craigslist sites, selected items that met the criteria above, and recorded the relevant asking price and seller's city (if reported). Since sellers are anonymous on Craigslist, no further demographic information (e.g., gender, age, or sexual orientation) was available. Our research assistants responded to advertisements over two weeks. Similar to other email audit studies, we checked for responses from sellers at multiple times: 24 h, 48 h, three days, and seven days after the initial email (Cui, Li, & Zhang, 2017). If confederates received a response from the seller, they sent a standard reply within 24 h that read, for example, "Thanks for your reply, but I've decided to buy a different item."

Based on previous studies in online marketplaces reporting rejection rates of 54.1 % or higher (Jeong, Minson, Yeomans, & Gino, 2019), we planned a priori to contact 720 sellers to ensure adequate statistical power. We used a block-randomized design so that the order of all 720 messages was determined in advance and every consecutive block of four messages included an email from each type of confederate.

Manipulation and negotiation. We created fictitious email accounts to contact sellers. The gender and sexual orientation of the confederate buyer were manipulated by varying the name, email address, and picture appearing in the email messages. Relying on past research, we manipulated the buyer's gender by using the names Sarah Miller and Colin Miller in their email addresses and email signatures (Correll, Benard, & Paik, 2007; Kang, DeCelles, Tilcsik, & Jun, 2016). In addition, just below the signature line, the email contained an electronic business card with a picture of the confederate along with their work title ("Assistant Broker"). Photos of the confederates came from the Chicago Faces Database, a repository of confederate pictures available for psychological research (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). The pictures used were rated as similar in age, attractiveness, and expression (Ma et al., 2015).

We manipulated the (perceived) sexual orientation of the confederate in two ways. First, in the homosexual condition, the profile picture in the email had a Pride flag in the background. Second, we drew from Tilcsik (2011), who conducted a large-scale audit study of discrimination against openly gay men in the U.S. by sending pairs of fictitious resumes to organizations with job postings in seven states. To signal homosexual orientation, the resume mentioned that the applicant had served as the elected treasurer managing the financial operations of a gay and lesbian organization. Given the concern that participation in a gay organization might be associated with progressive, liberal, or leftist political views, Tilcsik (2011) decided against using an apolitical control organization (or no control organization). Instead, he chose a control organization associated with progressive views, namely, the Progressive and Socialist Alliance. The pilot results reported by Tilcsik (2011) supported this rationale and provided evidence for equivalence between conditions. Following suit, we used email signatures in which the confederate was described as treasurer of the Progressive and Socialist Alliance in the heterosexual condition and the Gay and Lesbian Alliance in the homosexual condition.

The emails to sellers were brief and stated that the confederate buyer was interested in the item and inquired whether it was still available, whether the price was negotiable, and, if so, what price they would consider. The text of each initial email was identical across conditions apart from the email subject and reference to the item, which was



Fig. 1.1. Estimated marginal means of final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 1).

customized to match the advertisement. Examples of actual emails sent to sellers including the picture manipulation for each condition are presented in Fig. 2.0.

6.3. Measures

Outcome variable: Discount size. We recorded sellers' replies to the initial email inquiry. First, we coded each into one of two categories: "Response" or "No response." Next, for the sellers who provided a response, we coded their responses into one of three subcategories. The first set of responses indicated an unwillingness to change the price of the item, in which case the final price was recorded as equaling the asking price. The second set of responses provided a new, lower offer for the item, and this new sales price was recorded as the final price. The third set prompted confederate buyers to make an offer. In pilot tests, most sellers who offered a discount reduced the advertised price by 10–15 %; thus, when the confederate buyers were asked to provide an offer, they responded with an offer that was always 15 % lower than the original asking price. The confederate buyers then waited for the sellers' response, which either accepted the offer or made a different offer, and the new sales price was recorded as the final price. For all sellers, we calculated the outcome variable "discount size" as the percentage discount that the seller's response ultimately afforded vis-à-vis the original asking price.

Control variables: Since cities with more people may afford sellers with more alternative buyers, we used U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019) to gather data on city population and city size (square mileage) for the 234 cities in our sample. Additionally, we controlled for the original asking price because items with larger prices often have more room for negotiation. Moreover, we controlled for the number of days the item had been on the market because sellers with older inventory are often more motivated to offer discounts. Additionally, we controlled for the masculinity or femininity of the product categories, as prior research suggests some potential variance across categories. Specifically, research has demonstrated that some negotiation issues are considered prototypically masculine (e.g., the price of motorcycle headlights) or prototypically feminine (e.g., the price of beads for jewelry, Bear & Babcock, 2012). We theorized that products perceived to be feminine (masculine) might also be seen as congruent with female (male) negotiators. Thus, women (men) might be expected to know more about such products and have more competence in negotiating their prices. To this end, we hired two coders to classify the various product categories in terms of masculinity or femininity (see Supplemental Materials for detail). Finally, we controlled for the number of lesbian and gay individuals in the local population (Mallory, 2020) because prior research suggests that increased contact with individuals from different groups can reduce interpersonal bias (Allport, 1954; Cook, 1985).

7. Results

The overall response rate was comparable to other studies in online marketplaces, and relatively moderate (50.28 %). We found that sellers in Illinois, North Carolina, and Virginia were more likely to write back than sellers in Maryland. Of the 362 sellers who responded, 259 expressed a willingness to negotiate, and 100 of these requested counteroffers from our confederates. Effectively, 64.03 % of the sellers refused to negotiate (either actively or passively). Discounts ranged from 0 (unwilling to negotiate) to 50 %. Averaging across all 720 sellers, the mean discount was 4.04 %, and only 0.1 % of sellers gave a discount of 50 %. Across all sellers, 492 (68.33 %) gave no discount. Given the zero-inflated nature of discount size, a two-step model was used to analyze the data; the first model assesses the hurdle factors to giving a discount, while the second model assesses the same factors and their effect on the discount given.

The first model uses a mixed-effects logistic regression model assessing gender, sexual orientation, and their two-way interaction as the independent variables with a random intercept for the state where the advertisement was located, along with the controls described above. This analysis used the entire data set, $N = 720$, with a binary dependent variable where zero indicates no discount and one indicates a discount. The overall model was significant, $Wald\ \chi^2(10) = 18.91$, $p = 0.041$, with a significant interaction effect between gender and sexual orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 6.17$, $p = 0.013$. To test for significant differences between the marginal predicted probabilities, we conducted post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction. Results using this binary dependent



Fig. 2.0. Snapshots of emails sent to Craigslist sellers (Study 2).

variable were consistent with H1-2 but did not reach significance: Consistent with H1, straight men tended to receive a discount more often (35.1 %) than straight women (24.1 %), *Diff* = −11.1 %, *SE* = 0.05, $p = 0.132$. Consistent with H2, lesbian women tended to receive a discount more often (36.0 %) than straight women, *Diff* = 11.9 %, *SE* = 0.05, $p = 0.087$, and gay men tended to receive a discount less often (30.5 %) than straight men. The significant results of the joint analysis coupled with the marginal results of the post-hoc tests suggest there was not enough power to detect the size of differences observed in this binary dependent variable while protecting the comparison-wise error rate.

The second model is designed to assess the factors that contribute to the amount of the discount received if a discount was given; therefore, the second model used only the data where a discount was received ($N = 228$). This analysis uses a mixed-effects regression model assessing gender, sexual orientation, and their two-way interaction as the independent variables with a random intercept for the state where the advertisement was located. Additionally, this model controlled for the factors described above.[4] An initial inspection of the data indicated some collinearity between four product categories, which were dropped for that reason, and the hurdle model was refit controlling for the category of the product (see Supplemental Material for detail). The overall model was significant, *Wald* $\chi^2(36) = 63.88$, $p = 0.003$, as was an interaction between gender and sexual orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 4.79$, $p = 0.029$, with no other factors significantly contributing to the probability of receiving a discount.

These results, from the real and economically consequential online marketplace Craigslist, indicate that a significant hurdle to receiving a discount is the buyer's gender and sexual orientation. Once this hurdle is overcome, the buyer's gender and sexual orientation does not contribute to the size of the discount received; instead, the number of days the item has been on the market and the type of product being sold contributes the most to determining the size of the discount received (see Tables 2.0–2.4 and Fig. 2.1).

7.1. Study 3: Experimental study of negotiation offers and perceptions of dominance (U.S.)

We had three main motivations for conducting Study 3. First, having examined the moderating effect of sexual orientation on gender differences in both face-to-face and online negotiations, Study 3 sought to examine whether our findings hold in a tightly controlled experiment. Second, we sought to examine whether dominance serves as a mediator. Third, we wanted to manipulate homosexuality in a different way. To summarize the procedure, participants read a scenario in which they were selling a used camera via Craigslist to a potential buyer described as a heterosexual or homosexual male or female. As sellers, participants sought to achieve a high price. Based on the idea of mismatching (Pruitt & Syna, 1985), and consistent with H1-2, we predicted that participants would offer larger discounts to homosexual female and heterosexual male versus heterosexual female or homosexual male counterparts. Finally, and consistent with H3, we predicted that this effect would be mediated by perceptions of dominance.

[4] To better understand the effect of gender and sexual orientation on the discount received, post hoc comparisons on the marginal predicted means using the Bonferroni correction were conducted using the full dataset. Consistent with H1, straight men received a larger discount (29.82 %) than straight women (19.53 %); *Diff* = 10.292, *SE* = 3.465, $p = 0.018$. Consistent with H2, straight men also received a larger discount than gay men (20.70 %); *Diff* = 9.123, *SE* = 3.426, $p = 0.049$. However, the directionally consistent difference between straight women and lesbian women (23.75 %) was not significant, so H2 received only qualified support.

Table 2.0
Mixed-effect logistic regression of discount given (Study 2).

	Coef.	Std. error	95 % Conf. interval	p-value
Gender				
Male	(Reference)			
Female	−0.58	0.25	[−1.08, −0.09]	0.020
Sexual orientation				
Heterosexual	(Reference)			
Homosexual	−0.23	0.24	[−0.69, 0.23]	0.332
Gender × Sexual orientation[a]				
Straight male	(Reference)			
Gay male	(Reference)			
Straight female	(Reference)			
Lesbian female	0.85	0.34	[0.18, 1.52]	0.013
Asking price	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.304
Days on market	−0.01	0.01	[−0.02, 0.01]	0.523
City area (Sq. miles)	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.518
Gay population	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.619
Lesbian population	0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.694
Product femininity	0.08	0.12	[−0.16, 0.32]	0.528
Product masculinity	−0.11	0.09	[−0.29, 0.07]	0.239
Constant	−0.23	0.76	[−1.72, 1.26]	0.760
N	720			
Wald χ^2 (10) = 18.91				0.041

Mixed-effects logistic regression of discount given (0 = No, 1 = Yes) with a random-intercept at the state level.
[a] Significant contrast $\chi^2(1) = 6.17$, $p = 0.013$.

Table 2.1
Marginal predicted probabilities of receiving a discount by gender and sexual orientation (Study 2).

	Margins	Std. error
Gender × Sexual orientation		
Straight male	0.35	0.06
Gay male	0.31	0.05
Straight female	0.24	0.05
Lesbian female	0.36	0.06
Grand	0.31	0.05

Table 2.2
Post-hoc comparisons of marginal predicted probabilities of receiving a discount (Study 2).

	Contrast [95 % Conf. Int.]	z	p-value
Gender × Sexual orientation			
(Straight female) vs (Straight male)	−0.11 [−0.24, 0.02]	−2.29	0.132
(Gay male) vs (Straight male)	−0.05 [−0.17, 0.08]	−0.97	0.900
(Lesbian female) vs (Straight female)	0.12 [−0.01, 0.25]	2.44	0.087

Bonferroni correction was applied to control for multiple comparisons; statistics reports are the Bonferroni 95 % confidence interval, z-statistic, and p-value.

7.2. Sample and Procedure

Sample. Participants were 221 individuals enrolled in a Masters of Accounting or Masters of Business Administration program at a U.S. business school, and who had agreed to participate in a study about negotiation. Participants' mean age was 25.1 (*SD* = 0.96); they had over 3.5 years of work experience on average; 72.9 % were male; and 97.3 % identified as heterosexual.

Design. The study used a 2(Target gender: Male or female) × 2(Target sexual orientation: Heterosexual or homosexual) between-subjects factorial design.

Procedure. After reviewing a general description of the study, participants read a scenario indicating that they were selling a camera on

Table 2.3
Mixed-effect logistic regression of discount given and adjusting for advertisement category (Study 2).

	Coef.	Std. error	95 % Conf. interval	p-value
Gender				
Male	(Reference)			
Female	−0.58	0.27	[−1.11, −0.06]	0.029
Sexual orientation				
Heterosexual	(Reference)			
Homosexual	−0.19	0.25	[−0.68, 0.30]	0.446
Gender × Sexual orientation[a]				
Straight male	(Reference)			
Gay male	(Reference)			
Straight female	(Reference)			
Lesbian female	0.80	0.37	[0.08, 1.52]	0.029
Asking price	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.210
Days on market	−0.01	0.01	[−0.03, 0.03]	0.537
City area (Sq. miles)	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.432
Gay population	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.979
Lesbian population	0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.899
Product femininity	2.95	556.83	[−1088.40, 1094.31]	0.996
Product masculinity	2.89	626.43	[−1224.89, 1230.66]	0.996
Item Category: Video games	−1.79	1.21	[−4.16, 0.58]	0.139
Item Category: Toys & Games	−3.50	150.81	[−299.08, 292.08]	0.981
Item Category: Tools	−2.05	359.62	[−706.89, 702.79]	0.995
Item Category: Tickets	−5.03	846.84	[−1664.80, 1654.74]	0.995
Item Category: Sporting Goods	−4.10	823.64	[−1618.40, 1610.20]	0.996
Item Category: Photography & Videography	−5.96	870.04	[−1711.20, 1699.29]	0.995
Item Category: Musical instruments	−2.29	382.82	[−752.60, 748.02]	0.995
Item Category: Motorcycle parts	−0.53	81.21	[−159.70, 158.64]	0.995
Item Category: Jewelry	−2.43	394.42	[−775.48, 770.61]	0.995
Item Category: Household	0.41	278.41	[−545.27, 546.09]	0.999
Item Category: Furniture	−5.42	858.44	[−1687.93, 1677.09]	0.995
Item Category: Farm & Garden	−4.40	719.23	[−1414.07, 1405.27]	0.995
Item Category: Electronics	−5.82	1067.25	[−2097.58, 2085.95]	0.996
Item Category: Computers	−6.23	1113.65	[−2188.95, 2176.48]	0.996
Item Category: Collectibles	−2.60	313.22	[−616.49, 611.29]	0.993
Item Category: Cell phones	−8.80	1577.67	[−3100.98, 3083.38]	0.996
Item Category: Business	−8.33	1484.87	[−2918.62, 2901.96]	0.996
Item Category: Books	−1.03	278.41	[−546.71, 544.65]	0.997
Item Category: Bike parts	−2.15	487.22	[−957.09, 952.79]	0.996
Item Category: Bikes	−3.21	487.22	[−958.15, 951.73]	0.995
Item Category: Beauty & Health	−2.92	348.02	[−685.02, 679.18]	0.993
Item Category: Baby & Kids	−0.63	46.41	[−91.59, 90.32]	0.989
Item Category: Auto Parts	−1.65	394.42	[−774.70, 771.39]	0.997
Item Category: Arts & Crafts	0.78	208.81	[−408.48, 410.04]	0.997
Item Category: Appliances	−5.42	1299.26	[−2551.92, 2541.08]	0.997
Constant	21.41	4.61	[12.38, 30.43]	<0.001
N	720			
Wald χ^2 (36) = 63.88				0.003

Mixed-effects logistic regression of discount given with a random-intercept at the state level.
Item categories antiques, and wheels and tires were omitted because of collinearity.
[a] Significant contrast $\chi^2(1) = 4.79$, $p = 0.029$.

Table 2.4
Mixed-effect linear regression of size of discount (Study 2).

	Coef.	Std. error	95 % Conf. interval	p-value
Gender				
Male	(Reference)			
Female	−0.37	1.34	[−3.00, 2.24]	0.780
Sexual orientation				
Heterosexual	(Reference)			
Homosexual	−0.99	1.22	[−3.38, 1.39]	0.410
Gender × Sexual orientation				
Straight male	(Reference)			
Gay male	(Reference)			
Straight female	(Reference)			
Lesbian female	2.97	1.79	[−0.54, 6.48]	0.097
Asking price	−0.01	0.01	[−0.02, 0.00]	0.168
Days on market	−0.09	0.05	[−0.19, 0.01]	0.074
City area (Sq. miles)	0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.371
Gay population	−0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.868
Lesbian population	0.00	0.00	[−0.00, 0.00]	0.907
Product femininity	−1.06	0.77	[−2.58, 0.45]	0.169
Product masculinity	−0.43	0.55	[−1.50, 0.64]	0.427
Constant	21.41	4.61	[12.38, 30.43]	<0.001
N	228			
Wald χ^2 (10) = 11.93				0.290

Mixed-effects linear regression of size of discount with a random-intercept at the state level.

Craigslist and had placed the following advertisement, written in the style of a realistic ad:

> "Nikon D800 36.3MP Professional Digital SLR Camera Body with Battery and Cap V13.
> Asking Price: $500
> This offer includes Battery Charger MH-25, EN-EL15 battery, Lexar Professional 1066 × 64 GB compact flash card, owner's manual, and Original box and packing. The camera is in excellent condition with minor surface blemishes and is in excellent mechanical condition. The shutter count is 71,882.
> Has some wear on the bottom of the camera from regular use (common on these cameras, see photos)
> Only slight issue is that you have to manually pull out the sd card if you use that slot. It pushes in properly but the release doesn't work well and you just have to pull it out. Very minor but wanted to mention it.
> Awesome camera! Just starting shooting Fuji and don't need this anymore."

Participants further learned that they had received an email from a prospective buyer named Colin (Male conditions) or Sarah (Female conditions); the email expressed interest in the camera and inquired whether the price was negotiable.

Additionally, participants were told they had happened to look up the prospective buyer on social media and had learned a few things about them. Similar to Study 2, following Tilcsik (2011), the target's sexual orientation was reinforced by describing them as the former treasurer of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance (Homosexual target conditions), or the Progressive and Socialist Alliance (Heterosexual target conditions). However, one of the minor shortcomings of this method, which is applicable to much of the experimental research examining perceptions of homosexual individuals in the workplace (e.g., Bailey, Wallace, & Wright, 2013; Ellis & Vasseur, 1993; Horvath & Ryan, 2003; Pedulla, 2014; Tilcsik, 2011), is that participating in a gay and lesbian



Fig. 2.1. Adjusted predicted probabilities of receiving a discount by gender and sexual orientation (Study 2).

club does not necessarily imply that the person is gay or lesbian; instead, they might be an ally (Steffens, Niedlich, & Ehrke, 2016; Steffens, Niedlich, Kachel, & Methner, 2016). To mitigate this issue, we reinforced the target's homosexual identity by providing relationship information. However, we faced a further challenge with the terminology, as certain terms could be misconstrued. For example, "girlfriend" can connote a platonic relationship, whereas "partner" can connote a business associate. Hence, we decided to describe potential buyers as married to their long-term boyfriend or girlfriend, as appropriate.

After reading the scenario, participants were asked to make a counteroffer on the price of the camera and rate the target on perceived dominance (Rosette et al., 2016; Rudman et al., 2012). They concluded by answering some demographic questions.

7.3. Measures

Counteroffers. Participants were asked to type in a counteroffer for the camera.

Perceived dominance. Drawing from Rosette and colleagues' (2016) and Rudman et al. (2012) work examining stereotype categories related to dominance, participants rated whether the target was expected to be aggressive, bossy, controlling, demanding, dominating, intimidating, overbearing and ruthless (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These items were averaged to form a perceived dominance index (α = 0.89).

8. Results

A 2(Target gender) × 2(Target sexual orientation) ANOVA on counteroffers yielded only a significant interaction, $F(1,217) = 10.20$, $p = 0.002$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.05$. As predicted by H1, participants gave larger discounts to straight men ($M = 435.25$, $SD = 56.58$) than straight women ($M = 452.45$, $SD = 26.45$), $t(105) = 1.92$, $p = 0.029$. As predicted by H2, they also gave larger discounts to lesbian women ($M = 431.67$, $SD = 50.05$) than straight women, $t(102) = -2.57$, $p = 0.006$, and smaller discounts to gay men ($M = 453.60$, $SD = 38.89$) than straight men, $t(115) = 2.03$, $p = 0.022$.

Likewise, a 2(Target gender) × 2(Target sexual orientation) ANOVA on dominance perceptions yielded a significant interaction, $F(1,217) = 7.44$, $p = 0.007$, η_p^2=0.03. The pattern directly mirrored the above, as participants perceived straight men ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 0.97$) as more domineering than gay men ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 0.81$), $t(115) = -2.38$, $p = 0.009$. Though lesbian women ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.22$) were seen as more domineering than straight women ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 0.63$), the difference was marginally significant, $t(102) = 1.54$, $p = 0.064$.

To test the hypothesis that perceptions of dominance would mediate the relationship between the (gender × sexual orientation) interaction and counteroffers, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013; Model 8), with gender as the predictor variable, sexual orientation as the moderator, dominance perceptions as the mediator, and counteroffer as the dependent variable. As predicted and shown in Table 3.0, all signs were in the predicted direction, and the overall index of moderated mediation had a confidence interval excluding zero, CI = [−19.07, −0.24]. This supports the moderated mediation predicted by Hypothesis 3 (see Fig. 3.0).

9. Discussion

This study continued to show, using a different context and manipulation, that sexual orientation moderates the relationship between gender and negotiation outcomes, such that the documented negotiating advantage of (heterosexual) men vs. women breaks down for homosexual men and women (H1-2). Furthermore, it showed that dominance perceptions largely follow the same pattern, though the qualified support among women is noted. Most relevant for H3, however, the moderated relationship was mediated by perceptions of dominance.

9.1. Study 4: Experimental study of negotiation offers and perceptions of dominance in India

Like the majority of social and behavioral science research, our first three studies took place in the U.S., which is a Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) country. However, WEIRD countries contain only 12 % of the world's population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Therefore, we sought to replicate our findings in a non-WEIRD country, and this study also offered an opportunity to preregister (osf.io/5d2nb) our predictions. Thus, we preregistered and conducted Study 4 in India, the world's seventh-largest and second most populous country, which has become a fast-growing economy and major hub for IT services but would not be considered WEIRD.

Another purpose of this study was to manipulate sexual orientation

Table 3.0
Results of moderated mediation analysis (Study 3).

Outcome variable: Dominance

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.20	0.04	0.89	2.97	3	217	0.033

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.26	0.12	26.72	<0.001	3.02	3.50
Gender (Coded 1 for female)	3.26	0.12	26.72	<0.001	3.02	3.50
Sexual orientation (Coded 1 for homosexual)	−0.39	0.18	−2.26	0.025	−0.74	−0.05
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.70	0.26	2.73	0.007	0.19	1.20

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.03	7.44	1	217	0.007

Focal predictor: Gender (X)

Moderator variable: Sexual orientation (W)

	W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):	0	−0.50	0.18	−2.70	0.008	−0.86	−0.13
	1	0.20	0.18	1.13	0.261	−0.15	0.55

Outcome variable: Counteroffer Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.30	0.09	1964.16	5.51	4	216	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	469.79	11.85	39.65	<0.001	446.43	493.14
Gender	11.93	8.78	1.36	0.180	−5.37	29.23
Dominance	−10.59	3.18	−3.33	0.001	−16.87	−4.32
Sexual orientation	14.17	8.29	1.71	0.089	−2.17	30.51
Gender × Sexual orientation	−31.75	12.18	−2.61	0.010	−55.75	−7.74

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.03	6.79	1	216	0.010

W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0	11.93	8.78	1.36	0.180	−5.37	29.23
1	−19.82	8.33	−2.38	0.020	−36.23	−3.41

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:
Gender → Dominance → Counteroffer

W	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
0	5.27	3.44	0.26	13.51
1	−2.11	2.43	−8.00	1.64

Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Sexual orientation	−7.38	4.90	−19.07	−0.23

differently. Recall that in Study 3, similar to other research examining gay and lesbian issues, we manipulated sexual identity in part by indicating that the target was in a same-sex marriage versus a heterosexual marriage (Morton, 2017; Niedlich, Steffens, Krause, Settke, & Ebert, 2014). Although this manipulation disentangled the target's sexuality from potentially confounding variables such as their (non) "out" status, liberalism, and level of social activism, it did restrict our findings to those in committed relationships. This is a limitation in that many homosexual (and heterosexual) individuals are only dating. To address this issue, and since same-sex marriages are not currently legal in India, we used a quotation at the bottom of the outgoing email to denote the sexual orientation of the prospective buyer. In the Heterosexual target conditions, the email included a common Indian phrase: "Be Indian, buy Indian. Proud to be an Indian!" In the Homosexual target conditions, the email included a parallel but modified quote: "Be Indian, buy Indian. Proud to be a gay/lesbian Indian!" By using a quote at the bottom of the buyer's email, we could also mitigate any demand effects associated with encountering the buyer's social media profile in Study 3.

Yet another advantage of this study was that, whereas Study 3 examined only dominance as the mediator, this study included two additional, alternative mediators: perceived communality and



Fig. 3.0. Estimated marginal means of final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 3).

homophobia.[5] Whereas dominance is stereotypically viewed as a masculine trait, communality is stereotypically feminine. The literature has debated whether dominance and communality, and masculinity and femininity more generally, are independent traits or whether high levels of one necessitate low levels of the other. This debate is summarised in two established models. The orthogonal model sees masculinity and femininity as distinct constructs, such that individuals can have high or low levels of both (Bem, 1974; Biernat, 1991; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975). In contrast, the bipolar model posits that masculinity and femininity lie at the opposite ends of a continuum. Extant evidence indicates that individuals rely on the orthogonal model when making self-descriptions, and the bipolar model when judging others (Biernat, 1991; Foushee, Helmreich, & Spence, 1979). So, stereotypical views of others would place men as high in masculinity/low in femininity, and women as the opposite. If so, then it is possible that communality (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996) or warmth—which refers to an emotional, interpersonal orientation commonly associated with femininity—may partially explain the joint of effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation offers and outcomes in a direction opposite to dominance.

Our second alternative mediator, homophobia (i.e., dislike, disgust or other negative cognitions about homosexuality; Weinberg, 1972) may explain behaviors towards gay and lesbian negotiators. Homosexual individuals have been stigmatized in most societies and are viewed in negative ways involving status loss and social rejection (Bettinsoli, Suppes, & Napier, 2019; Yang, 1997). Interestingly, gays and lesbians are not stigmatized equally for their identities; rather people tend to hold more homophobic views and demonstrate more social distancing toward gay men. For example, one study found that gay men are more likely than lesbian women to encounter stigma and avoidant prejudice due to the sound of their voice (Fasoli, Hegarty, & Frost, 2021). Moreover, based on invisibility theory (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008), it is also possible that the prototypical homosexual is more likely to be seen as a gay man than a lesbian woman, and consequently, that lesbian women may be shielded against the adverse perceptions of gay men. This would suggest that some of the joint effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation offers and outcomes may be explained by differences in levels of homophobia. Thus, we included both homophobia and communality measures in this study. Finally, this study included a manipulation check regarding the gender and perceived sexual orientation of the negotiator.

Participants read a scenario indicating they were selling an idly stand[6] via an online marketplace to a potential buyer described as a heterosexual or homosexual man or woman. As sellers, participants sought a high price. As in Study 3, we tested all three hypotheses.

9.2. Sample and procedure

Preregistration. This study was preregistered at osf.io/5d2nb.

Sample. Participants were 307 individuals enrolled in a Masters of Business Administration program at a business school in India who had agreed to participate in a study about negotiation. Participants' mean age was 26.97 (SD = 2.59); they had more than four years of work experience on average; 60.6 % were male, and 99.34 % identified themselves as heterosexual. A total of 99.67 % were Indian nationals.

Design. The study used a 2(Target gender: Male or female) × 2(Target sexual orientation: Heterosexual or homosexual) between-subjects factorial design.

Procedure. After reading a general description of the study, participants read a scenario indicating they were selling an idly stand that had originally cost them INR 1947. They further learned that similar used idly stands sell for INR 1247 to INR 1647 on eBay and in second-hand stores. The participants were told that they had placed the following advertisement on Craigslist along with a picture (see Fig. 4.0).

> "Shell Shaped Idly Stand.
> Asking Price: INR 1450
> Moving to the U.S., and can't take my entire kitchen with me. Hence selling this beautiful stand for Rs. 500 less than what I bought it for. Used it only 3 times. Idlies came out fluffy and good. Guests loved the unique shell-shaped idlies that we served. Great asset for entertaining!
> Manufacturer's description: "Made from food grade aluminium (Hindalco 1100 grade) with non-stick coating (World renowned

[5] We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

[6] Idlies are savory rice cakes made with fermented rice and lentil batter, typically served as breakfast items in southern India. The idly batter is put into greased molds of an "idly stand" or tray for steaming. Typical molds are hemispherical in shape; shell-shaped molds are a recent invention and very much a novelty.

Fig. 4.0. Picture of shell-shaped idly stand used in the experimental materials (Study 4).

Weilburger Greblon coating) to help you cook fluffy, easy to scoop out rice cakes with a unique scallop shell shape. The Shell Idly plates (Height: 160 mm Width: 203 mm) can be used with your existing 5-litre pressure cooker or larger sized cookers and steamers.
Type: Induction & Standard; Material: PTFE Coated; Number of Idlies: 16; Color: Black"

Participants further learned that they had received an email from a prospective buyer named Gaurav (Male conditions) or Gowri (Female conditions), inquiring whether the price was negotiable. As noted, in the Heterosexual target conditions, a quote at the bottom of the email said: "Be Indian, buy Indian. Proud to be an Indian!".[7] In the Homosexual target conditions, the quote said: "Be Indian, buy Indian. Proud to be a gay/lesbian Indian!" After reading the scenario, participants were asked to make a counteroffer on the price of the idly stand and rate the target on perceived dominance (Rosette et al., 2016; Rudman et al., 2012). They concluded by answering some demographic questions.

9.3. Measures

Counteroffers. Participants were asked to type in a counteroffer for the idly stand.

Perceived dominance. We again drew from Rosette et al. (2016) and Rudman et al. (2012) work by asking participants to rate whether they expected the target to be aggressive, bossy, controlling, demanding, dominating, intimidating, overbearing, and ruthless (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree)—averaged to form a perceived dominance index ($\alpha = 0.96$).

Communality. We drew from Eagly and StefFen (1984) and Fiske et al. (2002) work by asking participants to rate whether they expected the target to be friendly, warm, helpful, trustworthy, good-natured, sentimental, sociable, and kind (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). The eight items were averaged to form a perceived communality index ($\alpha = 0.88$).

Homophobia. We drew from Wright, Adams, and Bernat (1999) work by asking participants to rate their agreement with five statements (The buyer is disgusting, I would not be friends with someone like the buyer, People like the buyer should not be allowed to work with children (e.g., as a schoolteacher), I would be uncomfortable having someone like the buyer be my coworker, The buyer is immoral) on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). The five items were averaged to form a homophobia index ($\alpha = 0.95$).

Manipulation Check. After completing the other measures, participants were asked to identify the gender and sexual orientation of the prospective buyer.

[7] Based on our findings from the pilot study, we expected that in the absence of any information about the sexual orientation of the buyer, they would be assumed to be heterosexual.

10. Results

An examination of responses to the manipulation check item revealed that all participants except one correctly identified the gender and sexual orientation of the prospective buyer. As preregistered, all were retained to be conservative. To test the hypotheses, we planned to conduct an ANOVA, series of direct comparisons, and moderated mediation analysis.

A 2(Target gender) × 2(Target sexual orientation) ANOVA on counteroffers yielded a significant interaction, $F(1,303) = 42.35$, $p < 0.001$, η_p^2=0.12. As predicted by H1, straight men received larger discounts ($M = 1342.38$, $SD = 54.20$) than straight women ($M = 1388.14$, $SD = 42.10$), $t(154) = 5.85$, $p < 0.001$. As predicted by H2, lesbian women also received larger discounts ($M = 1332.47$, $SD = 56.22$) than straight women ($M = 1388.14$, $SD = 42.09$), $t(152) = -6.96$, $p < 0.001$, whereas gay men received a smaller discount ($M = 1363.80$, $SD = 53.91$) than straight men ($M = 1342.38$, $SD = 54.20$), $t(151) = 2.45$, $p = 0.008$.

Likewise, a 2(Target gender) × 2(Target sexual orientation) ANOVA on dominance perceptions yielded a significant interaction, $F(1,303) = 28.51$, $p < 0.001$, η_p^2=0.09. The pattern directly mirrored the above, as participants perceived straight men ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.60$) as more dominant than straight women ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.07$), $t(152) = -3.48$, $p < 0.001$. Lesbian women were also perceived as more dominant ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.33$) than straight women ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.07$), $t(152) = 5.56$, $p < 0.001$, whereas gay men were perceived less dominant ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 1.30$) than straight men ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.60$), $t(151) = -2.33$, $p = 0.011$.

To test H3, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis, with gender as the predictor variable, sexual orientation as the moderator, dominance perceptions as the mediator, and counteroffer as the dependent variable. As predicted and shown in Table 4.0, all signs were in the predicted direction, and the overall index of moderated mediation had a confidence interval excluding zero, CI = [−52.13, −23.32]. This supports H3.

To test whether perceptions of dominance mediate the moderated relationship over and above perceptions of homophobia or communality, we conducted a multiple moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013; Model 8), with gender as the predictor variable; sexual orientation as the moderator; dominance perceptions, homophobia, and communality as the mediators; and counteroffer as the dependent variable. As predicted and shown in Table 4.1, all signs were in the predicted direction, and the overall index of moderated mediation had a confidence interval excluding zero for dominance, CI = [−52.95, −24.21] and communality CI = [0.79, 9.94], but not for homophobia CI = [−1.18, 5.58]. This supports our moderated mediation hypothesis for dominance and suggests that communality may operate as an additional mediator in the opposite direction. However, homophobia does not appear to mediate this relationship (see Fig. 4.1).

11. Discussion

This study replicates the finding that sexual orientation moderates the relationship between gender and negotiation outcomes, and that dominance perceptions mediate this relationship. However, it does so in a non-WEIRD country, India, using a different manipulation of sexual orientation. Additionally, it shows that communality serves as an alternative mediator, consistent with a bipolar view of dominance-communality and masculinity-femininity in general. However, homophobia does not serve as an alternative mediator, suggesting that the findings are not driven by disgust or disliking. Overall, this study significantly extends our findings and bolsters confidence in their replicability.

Table 4.0
Results of moderated mediational analyses examining the mediating effect of dominance on the joint relationship of gender and sexual orientation on counteroffers (Study 4).

Outcome variable: Dominance

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.31	0.10	1.80	10.57	3	303	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	T	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.81	0.15	24.93	<0.001	3.51	4.11
Gender (Coded 1 for female)	−0.77	0.22	−3.54	0.001	−1.19	−0.34
Sexual orientation (Coded 1 for homosexual)	−0.55	0.22	−2.54	0.012	−0.98	−0.12
Gender × Sexual orientation	1.64	0.31	5.34	<0.001	1.032	2.24

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng		F	df1	df2	p	
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.09		28.51	1	303	<0.001	
	W	**Effect**	**se**	**t**	**p**	**LLCI**	**ULCI**
	0	−0.77	0.22	−3.54	0.001	−1.19	−0.34
	1	0.87	0.22	4.01	<0.001	0.44	1.30

Outcome variable: Counteroffer Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.67	0.45	1757.37	60.66	4	302	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	T	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1429.57	8.35	171.31	<0.001	1413.15	1445.99
Gender	28.27	6.89	4.10	<0.001	14.70	41.84
Dominance	−22.89	1.80	−12.74	<0.001	−26.42	−19.35
Sexual orientation	8.83	6.85	1.29	0.198	−4.65	22.31
Gender × Sexual orientation	−39.69	10.01	−3.97	<0.001	−59.39	−19.99

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.03	15.72	1	302	<0.001

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0	28.27	6.89	4.10	<0.001	14.70	41.84
1	−11.43	6.96	−1.64	0.102	−25.11	2.26

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:
Gender → Dominance → Counter

W	Effect	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
0	17.50	5.16	7.25	27.43
1	−19.91	5.13	−30.46	−10.17

Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):

	Index	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Sexual orientation	−37.41	7.36	−52.14	−23.33

11.1. Study 5: Face-to-face field experiment in southern Indian markets

Taken together, the findings of Studies 1–4 provide converging evidence for the interactive effect of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation outcomes. Study 2 was especially helpful for establishing the generalizability and real-world implications of our theory. However, Study 2′s reliance on an email audit study imposed some limitations, particularly the possibility of nonresponse bias. To mitigate this concern and replicate the findings again in a non-WEIRD country, we designed a face-to-face field experiment in Chennai: the capital of and largest city in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, with more than 4.5 million inhabitants.

Table 4.1
Results of moderated mediational analyses examining the mediating effects of dominance, communality, and homophobia on the joint relationship of gender and sexual orientation on counteroffers (Study 4).

Outcome variable: Dominance
Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.31	0.10	1.80	10.57	3	303	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	3.81	0.15	24.93	<0.001	3.51	4.11
Gender	−0.77	0.22	−3.54	0.001	−1.19	−0.340
Sexual Orientation	−0.55	0.22	−2.54	0.012	−0.98	−0.12
Gender × Sexual orientation	1.64	0.31	5.34	<0.001	1.03	2.24

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.09	28.51	1	303	<0.001

W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0	−0.76	0.22	−3.54	0.001	−1.19	−0.34
1	0.87	0.22	4.01	<0.001	0.44	1.30

Outcome variable: Counteroffer
Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.17	0.03	0.42	2.85	3	303	0.038

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	4.59	0.07	62.40	<0.001	4.45	4.74
Gender	0.14	0.10	1.37	0.171	−0.06	0.35
Sexual Orientation	0.30	0.10	2.83	0.005	0.09	0.50
Gender × Sexual orientation	−0.35	0.15	−2.40	0.017	−0.64	−0.06

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.02	5.77	1	303	0.017

W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0	0.14	0.10	1.37	0.170	−0.06	0.35
1	−0.21	0.10	−2.02	0.040	−0.42	−0.01

Outcome variable: Homophobia

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.26	0.07	1.06	7.12	3	303	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1.89	0.12	16.14	<0.001	1.66	2.12
Gender	−0.31	0.17	−1.90	0.059	−0.64	0.01
Sexual Orientation	0.37	0.17	2.21	0.028	0.04	0.69
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.25	0.24	1.07	0.285	−0.21	0.71

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.004	1.15	1	303	0.285

Outcome variable: Counteroffer

Model Summary

(*continued on next page*)

Table 4.1 (*continued*)

Outcome variable: Dominance
Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	0.70	0.49	1636.34	47.49	6	300	<0.001

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Constant	1481.36	20.64	71.76	<0.001	1440.73	1521.98
Gender	31.43	6.69	4.70	<0.001	18.26	44.60
Dominance	−23.73	1.75	−13.60	<0.001	−27.17	−20.30
Communality	−13.12	3.69	−3.55	<0.001	−20.38	−5.85
Homophobia	6.16	2.31	2.67	0.008	1.62	10.70
Sexual Orientation	9.99	6.76	1.48	0.141	−3.32	23.29
Gender × Sexual orientation	−44.50	9.71	−4.58	<0.001	−63.61	−25.39

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
Gender × Sexual orientation	0.04	21.00	1	300	<0.001

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

W	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0	31.43	6.69	4.70	<0.001	18.26	44.60
1	−13.07	6.75	−1.94	0.054	−26.34	0.20

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

Gender → Dominance → Counteroffer

W	Effect	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
0	18.15	5.23	8.20	28.64
1	−20.65	5.16	−30.72	−10.32

Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):

	Index	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Sexual Orientation	−38.79	7.42	−52.95	−24.21

Gender → Communality → Counteroffer

W	Effect	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
0	−1.87	1.30	−4.74	0.49
1	2.77	1.81	−0.28	6.81

Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):

	Index	Boot SE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Sexual Orientation	4.64	2.37	0.79	9.95

Gender → Homophobia → Counteroffer

W	Effect	BootSE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
0	−1.94	1.20	−4.74	−0.12
1	−0.39	1.28	−3.10	2.19

Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects):

	Index	Boot SE	Boot LLCI	Boot ULCI
Sexual Orientation	1.55	1.70	−1.18	5.58

We specifically chose Chennai because we wanted to ensure a safe environment for our confederates. According to a 2019 survey, the Indian states/union territories with the highest acceptance of the LGBT community were Uttar Pradesh (36 %) and Tamil Nadu (30 %) (Rampal, 2019). However, Uttar Pradesh has the highest incidence of crime in India, whereas Tamil Nadu ranks at number seven (National Crime Records Bureau of India, 2018). Thus, for the safety of our confederates, we chose the latter. Chennai, in particular, is considered a relatively gay-



Fig. 4.1. Estimated marginal means of final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 4).

friendly city (Menon, 2018): It is the second Indian city to host an annual pride parade as well as the home of several prominent LGBT individuals and organizations. These include Rose Venkatesan, the first *trans*-woman talk show host in India; Gopi Shankar Madurai, the first openly inter-sex and gender-queer candidate to run in an Indian election; and the prominent Tamil Nadu Rainbow Coalition. These features of Chennai suggest that its inhabitants are likely more open to LGBT ideas and familiar with the pride flag used in our manipulation.

Sample. The study aimed to draw from a sample of 160 street hawkers. We chose sellers at random from Thyagaraya Nagar, known locally as T. Nagar: a bustling shopping district in which individuals sell items such as earphones, flip-flops, selfie-sticks, soft toys, sofa covers, children's umbrellas, baseball caps, and keychains. The only restriction was that they had to be located at least 20 feet away from other sellers in the sample. However, the final sample consisted of 132 hawkers, as we chose to terminate the study prematurely due to one confederate's reports of incivility toward them.[8]

Design. This study used a 2(Gender: Male or female) × 2(Sexual orientation: Heterosexual or homosexual) between-subjects factorial design.

Procedure. We hired confederates who met several criteria: First, to avoid familiarity with the sellers, they could not be from Tamil Nadu. Second, they had to be familiar with bargaining. Third, we specifically sought confederates who were between 20 and 22 years old (as younger people are often less likely to be closeted in India) and came from typical middle-class backgrounds (so they could convincingly depict adequate purchasing power). Four of the confederates were men, and four were women. One of the female confederates identified as lesbian and another as bisexual; one male confederate identified as gay; the rest of the confederates identified as heterosexual.

The confederates received extensive training on the experimental setup, the products to be negotiated, and their initial assignments. Specifically, the confederates spent three days in training consisting of classroom presentations and discussion, practical observation of the area, and a pilot exercise. The first part of the training involved introducing the confederates to the experimental setup without revealing the research questions of interest. Confederates were told that they were part of a study seeking to understand the market structure, gender and sexual orientation of the buyers, and functioning of the local entrepreneurs (street hawkers) in Chennai. To avoid "demand effects," however, they were not informed about the hypotheses being tested. Confederates were also educated about the assorted products sold in the market, thereby enabling them to bargain knowledgeably. Subsequently, confederates went through a range of role-playing exercises to practice acting like a heterosexual or homosexual buyer and to achieve consistency in their acting. This portion of the training involved learning a prescripted bargaining routine. However, confederates were instructed to prioritize safety and told that they could abandon the experiment at any sign of trouble, without consequences. Additionally, we communicated a confederate safety plan to be followed if sellers were uncivil, agreeing to provide counseling services or referrals if needed. The final element of the classroom training entailed practicing how to fill out a "transaction form," a custom form designed to capture prices and other transaction details, after each purchase.

After the classroom education, confederates participated in field training in Chennai. They were given detailed maps marking the approximate locations of sellers in the sample and were shown the different localities via a scooter tour. Confederates were given the street address of the sellers they would visit and list of items to be negotiated (all within a pre-defined price range). Finally, a pilot experiment was conducted in another locality called Anna Nagar. Here, confederates visited a small sample of sellers to practice delivering their lines and filling out the transaction form. A randomization code (Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2008) was used to assign one confederate to one street during one time period, such that each seller was paired with only one confederate. Imposing these constraints on the randomization code ensured a between-subjects design in which sellers interacted with only one confederate.

The bargaining routine, modeled on typical informal market behavior in India (Iyer & Schoar, 2015; Ranganathan, 2018), was standardized across all transactions: After reaching an assigned seller, the confederate would survey the seller's products before choosing an item (or a bundle of items) that was in the INR 100–500 range. The confederate would then seek the seller's attention and ask for the price. Upon hearing the price, the confederate would offer half the quoted price. It was anticipated that the seller would not accept this offer and would suggest a counter. The confederate would then ask for the seller's best price. The bargaining would cease at this point, and the confederate

[8] Specifically, a confederate enacting a gay buyer encountered one instance of rude remarks about their sexual orientation.

would pay the final price demanded by the seller and record the transaction. Each confederate visited an average of 16 or 17 sellers, pretending to be a homosexual individual during half of the visits and a heterosexual during the other half.

Manipulation and negotiation. We manipulated homosexuality by training each confederate to play the role of a homosexual or heterosexual individual visiting the bazaar with their romantic interest. The romantic interest was played by two actors who were trained to appear uninterested in the shopping process and to be deeply involved in a cell phone conversation. Their presence was necessary to add to the realism of a same-sex or different-sex couple shopping in Chennai. Actors playing the romantic interest were strictly forbidden from engaging with sellers or conversing excessively with their confederate partner. They could only say, "Darling, please buy whatever you want". Confederates were trained to sensually stroke the arm of the actor to suggest intimacy with him or her and were also required to wear a T-shirt that would hint at their orientation. In the heterosexual condition, the confederate was paired with an actor of the opposite gender and wore a neutral T-shirt. In the homosexual condition, the confederate was paired with an actor of the same gender and wore a T-shirt depicting the pride flag. It was impressed on both confederates and accompanying actors that only the confederate was allowed to initiate and continue bargaining with sellers. In sum, male and female confederates portrayed as heterosexual or homosexual engaged in a scripted bargaining exercise with sellers in a South Indian market, and we recorded the discounts and outcomes they received.

11.2. Measures

Outcome variable: Discount size. Similar to Study 2, we calculated the outcome variable "discount size" as the percentage discount that the seller ultimately offered relative to the asking price. For example, if the seller first stated that a pair of sunglasses cost INR 100 but ultimately offered INR 75, then the discount was recorded as 25 %.

Control variables: We controlled for the original asking price as well as the seller's gender (coded 1 for female, and 0 for male; only 3.8 % were women). Lastly, and similar to Study 2, we created two binary variables: feminine product and masculine product. For the feminine product variable, items intended for feminine use only (e.g., female outfit) were coded 1, and 0 otherwise. For the masculine product variable, items intended for masculine use only (e.g., male wristwatch) were coded 1, and 0 otherwise.

12. Results

Overall, only 17.4 % of the sellers refused to negotiate and maintained that they had a fixed price policy. Discounts ranged from 0 to 50 %. The average discount was 23.4 %, and 14.4 % of sellers gave a 50 % discount. These results suggest a far greater willingness to negotiate in an Indian market than among U.S. Craigslist sellers in Study 2, and they mirror findings from other studies examining market behavior in India (e.g., Iyer & Schoar, 2015; Ranganathan, 2018).

We began by testing for potential hurdles to receiving a discount. This analysis used a mixed-effects logistic regression with discount received (0 = no, 1 = yes) as the dependent variable and gender (0 = male, 1 = female), sexual orientation (0 = heterosexual, 1 = homosexual), and their two-way interaction as the independent variables, with random effects for gender and sexual orientation. In addition, we controlled for the asking price, seller's gender, and masculine and feminine product dummy variables. The feminine product dummy variable was dropped due to perfect prediction. The overall model was significant, *Wald* $\chi^2(6) = 14.38$, $p = 0.026$. However, only the asking price of the product was significant, $b = 0.04$, $z = 3.63$, $p < 0.001$; the interaction between gender and sexual orientation was not, $\chi^2(1) = 0.23$, $p = 0.628$.

Next, we conducted a mixed-effects linear regression with discount size as the dependent variable and gender (0 = male, 1 = female), sexual orientation (0 = heterosexual, 1 = homosexual), and their two-way interaction as the independent variables, with random effects for gender and sexual orientation. In addition, we controlled for asking price, seller gender, and masculine product dummy variable. The overall model was significant, *Wald* $\chi^2(6) = 49.69$, $p < 0.001$, as was the hypothesized interaction between gender and sexual orientation, $\chi^2(1) = 7.71$, $p = 0.006$, as well as the asking price, $b = 0.068$, $p < 0.001$. To better understand the effect of gender and sexual orientation on the discount received, post hoc comparisons on the marginal predicted means using the Bonferroni correction were conducted. Consistent with H1, straight men received a larger discount (29.82 %) than straight women (19.53 %); $Diff = 10.292$, $SE = 3.465$, $p = 0.018$. Consistent with H2, straight men also received a larger discount than gay men (20.70 %); $Diff = 9.123$, $SE = 3.426$, $p = 0.049$. However, the directionally consistent difference between straight women and lesbian women (23.75 %) was not significant, so H2 received only qualified support.

13. Discussion

This study extends our research to a real market setting in India. The focal interaction between gender and sexual orientation did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of receiving a discount. In retrospect, we would attribute this to insufficient variability, as items with asking prices above INR 200 were discounted more than 95 % of the time; see Table 1, Table 2, and Fig. 1. However, the interaction between gender and sexual orientation did influence the amount of the discounts received. Consistent with H1-2, heterosexual males enjoyed a comparative bargaining advantage, while homosexual males and heterosexual females suffered a disadvantage. Qualifying the study's support for H2, the directional advantage of homosexual females (versus heterosexual females) was not significant. In retrospect, we would attribute this to the small sample size which was necessitated due to terminating the study prematurely due to one confederate's report of incivility (see Tables 5.0–5.4 and Fig. 5.0).

14. General discussion

Integrating MOSAIC theory, intersectional invisibility theory, and negotiation theory on mismatching, we predicted that the effect of gender on negotiation outcomes depends on a negotiator's perceived sexual orientation. Put differently, we challenged the general finding that, on average, men outperform women in negotiations, predicting that this pattern would only hold for straight men and women and would not extend to the many people who identify as gay or lesbian. To test these predictions, we conducted five studies relying on complementary methods, using different samples and different kinds of negotiations, which provided converging although sometimes mixed support. Moreover, two of our studies documented an underlying mechanism: the stereotypically masculine trait of perceived dominance. Furthermore, one study suggested that perceived communality, a stereotypically feminine trait at the other end of the continuum, may play an important role as well. Specifically, lesbian women were seen as more dominant and less communal than straight women and thus received larger discounts, whereas gay men were seen as less dominant and more communal than straight men and thus received smaller discounts. These findings enrich our knowledge of dominance and communality and are consistent with a bipolar view of masculinity and femininity in general. Furthermore, they extend the literature on gender and negotiation as well as the organizational literature more broadly by challenging research to move beyond main effects of gender and account for the intersecting effects of gender and sexual orientation.

15. Theoretical contributions

Our findings extend the organizational literature by highlighting

Table 5.0
Mixed-effects logistic regression of discount received (Study 5).

	Interaction model[a]					Additive model[b]				
	Coef.	Std. error	z	p	95 % Conf. interval	Coef.	Std. error	z	p	95 % Conf. interval
Gender (Confederate)										
Male	(Reference)					(Reference)				
Female	−0.84	0.87	−0.96	0.335	[−2.54, 0.87]	−0.52	0.57	−0.92	0.355	[−1.63, 0.59]
Sexual orientation (Confederate)										
Heterosexual	0.00	0.00				0.00	0.00			
Homosexual	−0.83	0.86	−0.96	0.336	[−2.52, 0.86]	−0.52	0.56	−0.92	0.360	[−1.62, 0.59]
Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)[c]										
Straight male	(Reference)									
Gay male	(Reference)									
Straight female	(Reference)									
Lesbian female	0.55	1.14	0.48	0.628	[−1.68, 2.79]					
Asking price	0.04	0.01	3.63	<0.001	[0.02, 0.06]	0.04	0.01	3.62	<0.001	[0.02, 0.06]
Gender (Seller)										
Male	(Reference)					(Reference)				
Female	−1.07	1.41	−0.76	0.450	[−3.83, 1.70]	−0.89	1.36	−0.65	0.513	[−3.55, 1.77]
Masculine product										
No	(Reference)					(Reference)				
Yes	−0.84	0.58	−1.47	0.143	[−1.97, 0.29]	−0.83	0.57	−1.45	0.146	[−1.96, 0.29]
Constant	−2.94	1.39	−2.12	0.034	[−5.66, 0.22]	−3.11	1.34	−2.32	0.020	[−5.73, −0.48]

Mixed-effects logistic regression of discount given (0 = No, 1 = Yes) with a random-intercept at the individual level gender, and sexual orientation.
[a] N = 132, Wald χ^2 (6) = 14.38, p = 0.026.
[b] N = 132, Wald χ^2 (5) = 14.30, p = 0.014.
[c] χ^2 (1) = 0.23, p = 0.628.

Table 5.1
Marginal predicted probabilities of receiving a discount (Study 5).

	Interaction model		
	Margins	Std. error	95 % Conf. interval
100 Asking Price: Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)			
Straight male	0.69	0.13	[0.43, 0.96]
Gay male	0.51	0.14	[0.24, 0.77]
Straight female	0.50	0.14	[0.24, 0.77]
Lesbian female	0.44	0.13	[0.18, 0.70]
Overall	0.54	0.08	[0.38, 0.69]
200 Asking Price: Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)			
Straight male	0.99	0.01	[0.97, 1.01]
Gay male	0.98	0.02	[0.95, 1.02]
Straight female	0.98	0.02	[0.95, 1.02]
Lesbian female	0.98	0.02	[0.93, 1.02]
Overall	0.98	0.02	[0.95, 1.01]
300 Asking Price: Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)			
Straight male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Gay male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Straight female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Lesbian female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Overall	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
400 Asking Price: Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)			
Straight male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Gay male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Straight female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Lesbian female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Overall	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
500 Asking Price: Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)			
Straight male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Gay male	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Straight female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Lesbian female	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]
Overall	1.00	0.001	[1.00, 1.00]

how intersectionality can explain group-based disparities in negotiation performance more precisely than gender alone. Nearly all previous research on gender differences in negotiation has treated the members of each gender as uniform (e.g., Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007; Kray & Babcock, 2006; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). The predictions in this work are often grounded in social role theory and status characteristics theory, which

Table 5.2
Mixed-effects linear regression of discount size (Study 5).

	Coef.	Std. error	Z	p	95 % Conf. interval
Gender (Confederate)					
Male	(Reference)				
Female	−10.29	3.47	−2.97	0.003	[−17.08, −3.50]
Sexual orientation (Confederate)					
Heterosexual	0.00	0.00			
Homosexual	−9.12	3.43	−2.66	0.008	[−15.84, −2.41]
Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)[a]					
Straight male	(Reference)				
Gay male	(Reference)				
Straight female	(Reference)				
Lesbian female	13.35	4.81	2.78	0.006	[3.92, 22.77]
Asking price	0.07	0.01	6.05	<0.001	[0.05, 0.09]
Gender (Seller)					
Male	0.00	0.00			
Female	−3.37	6.50	−0.52	0.604	[−16.11, 9.37]
Masculine product					
No	0.00	0.00			
Yes	−2.55	2.601	−0.98	0.328	[−7.65, 2.55]
Constant	17.46	3.51	4.98	<0.001	[10.59, 24.33]
N	132				
Wald χ^2 (6) = 49.69				<0.001	

Mixed-effects linear regression of discount size with a random-intercept at the state level.
[a] Significant contrast, χ^2 (1) = 7.71, p = 0.006.

Table 5.3
Marginal predicted means of discount size by gender and sexual orientation (Study 5).

	Margins	Std. error
Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)		
Straight male	29.82	2.45
Gay male	20.70	2.39
Straight female	19.53	2.40
Lesbian female	23.75	2.40

Table 5.4
Post-hoc comparisons of marginal predicted means of discount size (Study 5).

	Contrast	[95 % Conf. Int.]	z	p-value
Gender (Confederate) × Sexual orientation (Confederate)				
(Straight female) vs (Straight male)	−10.29	[−19.43, −1.15]	−2.97	0.018
(Gay male) vs (Straight male)	−9.12	[−18.16, −0.09]	−2.66	0.046
(Lesbian female) vs (Straight female)	4.23	[−4.68, 13.13]	1.25	1.000

Bonferroni correction was applied to control for multiple comparisons; statistics reports are the Bonferroni 95 % confidence interval, z-statistic, and p-value.

suggest that women are stereotyped as warm and communal, whereas men are stereotyped as assertive and agentic. Since the female stereotypes are less congruent with the image of effective negotiators, who are expected to be competitive and dominant (Bowles et al., 2007; Mazei et al., 2015), such research has predicted and shown that men receive superior negotiation outcomes. However, this meta-analytic result is relatively weak (Mazei et al., 2015), and the fact that the stereotypes predicted by social role and status characteristics theory do not extend to gay men and lesbian women may help to explain why. Indeed, as noted, gay men are often stereotyped as non-dominant, whereas lesbian women are often stereotyped as dominant and assertive (Kite & Deaux, 1987). Our research contributes to the literature by examining the effects of these intersecting and varying stereotypes at the bargaining table—that is, by studying the joint effects of gender and sexual orientation on negotiation outcomes. We demonstrate that compatibility between stereotypes of lesbian women as domineering and stereotypes of effective negotiators affords lesbian women a negotiation advantage vis-à-vis straight women. Conversely, the incompatibility between gay male stereotypes of warmth and passivity and stereotypes of effective negotiators appears to saddle gay men with a negotiation disadvantage vis-à-vis straight men.

Our studies also offer converging albeit mixed support for the assertion that sexual orientation matters in negotiation. Specifically, we extend work that has uncovered the effects of important social identities such as gender (e.g. Bowles et al., 2007) and race (e.g. Hernandez et al., 2018, Toosi, Mor, Semnani-Azad, Phillips, & Amanatullah, 2019) on negotiation outcomes by adding an investigation of sexual orientation, we believe for the first time. Additionally, our research extends the small body of work on the treatment of gay men and lesbian women in other business settings (Clair, Beatty, & Maclean, 2005; Herek, 1996; Reimann, 2001; Tilcsik, 2011; Woods, 1994) by adding an investigation of homosexuality in the important organizational setting of negotiation.

Our research also adds to a growing literature examining the impact of intersectionality, or multiple social category memberships, on workplace phenomena (Acker, 2006; Bell Smith & Nkomo, 2001; Toosi et al., 2019; Rosette & Livingston, 2012; Rosette et al., 2016). Research on the impact of social identities in organizations has a long and fascinating history. Traditionally, much of this research has examined these identities one-at-a-time by holding other identities constant or not measuring them. With diversity steadily growing in modern organizations, however, researchers have started to study how multiple, intersecting social memberships interact to mold the experiences and outcomes of diverse organizational members. These initial efforts have largely focused on experiences and outcomes relating to leadership, teams, and hiring or job selection (Hill & Gunderson, 2015; Rosette & Livingston, 2012; Rosette et al., 2016). As an initial foray in the negotiation literature, some scholars have probed the joint effect of race and gender in negotiations (Hernandez et al., 2018; Toosi et al., 2019). Our research adds to this important effort by establishing that the nexus of gender and sexual orientation also requires careful consideration, including in the negotiation setting.

Our research also joins the current conversation about the effects of membership in multiple subordinated identity groups (Bell Smith & Nkomo, 2001; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Rosette & Livingston, 2012). Several researchers have posited that individuals who belong to several subordinated groups (e.g., Black women) face double jeopardy and thus end up worse-off than those belonging to just one (e.g., White women; Rosette & Livingston, 2012). In contrast, intersectionality scholars have argued that belonging to multiple subordinated groups may occasionally permit people to avoid the penalties usually incurred by those belonging to only one (e.g. Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Our research adds to the evidence for the second perspective by demonstrating a positive effect of joint membership in the groups woman and homosexual. It also extends the logic of intersectionality—previously focused on stigmatized groups—to the non-stigmatized group of men, suggesting that intersecting membership in a stigmatized category (gay) may dilute the advantages afforded by their primary identity. Thus, intersectionality theory may apply more broadly than previously thought.



Fig. 5.0. Estimated marginal means of final sale price by gender and sexual orientation (Study 5).

16. Limitations and future directions

Like all research, our has limitations that may seed future work. First, we note that our results were largely consistent but sometimes mixed, particularly in our naturalistic field studies (#2 and 5). For example, although lesbian women outperformed and were seen as more dominant than straight women in other studies, the directional difference in discount size within Study 2 did not reach significance, and lesbian women only directionally outperformed straight women in Study 5. These weaker results for lesbian women in less controlled settings should be noted. However, weaker results for lesbian women are also consistent with work suggesting that lesbian women may face fewer adverse perceptions than gay men (Fasoli et al., 2021). Future work should seek to replicate our results in a field setting and examine whether sexual orientation may serve as a stronger moderator for men than women, perhaps because gay men receive particular backlash for dominance displays.

Additional research is also required to understand the broader influence of intersectionality in negotiations. The present set of studies focuses on the intersection of sexual orientation and gender, but other intersecting identities could have equally important effects on negotiation outcomes. Indeed, some of these identities could represent boundary conditions of our effects. Although we randomized or held constant demographic variables other than gender and sexual orientation, future studies could consider the influence of social identities such as age or race. Might younger lesbian women be treated differently than older lesbian women at the bargaining table? Might Hispanic lesbian women be treated differently compared to White lesbian women? Relatedly, while our research focused on gay men and lesbian women, future research might study the negotiation experiences of people who identify as bisexual, transgender, queer, and pan-sexual. Indeed, as organizations continue to evolve and diversify, increased attention to these and the intersection of multiple other social identities is needed. Finally, most participants in our studies were heterosexual. As such, it would be fruitful to explore whether people who identify as LGBTQ+ themselves react the same way.

Even when restricting the analysis to gender and social orientation, our work is but a first step toward understanding how intersecting identities interact to determine negotiation outcomes. Future researchers should explore whether the sexual orientation of a negotiating counterpart influences the desire to initiate negotiations with them, or whether it impacts subjective negotiation outcomes such as satisfaction with a deal (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). While lesbian women may obtain better pecuniary outcomes than straight women, for example, it is conceivable that their perceived dominance reduces their negotiation partners' subjective outcomes. As these examples illustrate, the current research paves the way for a variety of fascinating future studies.

Relatedly, future research might examine other negotiating contexts that might moderate the apparent bargaining advantage of lesbian women or disadvantage of gay men. For example, in three of our studies, individuals could not freely pick their negotiation partner. In multiparty negotiation settings, however, negotiators often choose which counterparts to engage, so their perception of lesbian women as dominant may lead them to avoid such individuals as counterparts (as suggested above). Additionally, research has found that gender differences in negotiation outcomes are reduced when women negotiate on behalf of others (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Nohe et al., 2022). It is possible that this form of other advocacy may also attenuate or reverse lesbian women's relative advantage in a negotiation. Thus, while some negotiation contexts may inherently favor lesbian women, others may not.

Future research may also wish to explore negotiation-specific boundary conditions of our results,[9] e.g., that they may be limited to one-shot deals and/or distributive negotiations with a reasonably large bargaining zone. For example, our proposed negotiation mismatch mechanism (i.e., if I expect dominance, I acquiesce) may not emerge if the bargaining zone is narrow, as the other party may be forced to walk away (rather than go below his or her bottom line). In addition, extant research has shown how dominance can be self-defeating in integrative negotiations (Olekalns & Smith, 2013; Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002), so it is possible that lesbian women's advantage may become a liability in those contexts. Likewise, the general male advantage in negotiation may not extend to traditionally feminine-stereotyped negotiation contexts such as bargaining for childcare, as women may be seen as equally effective negotiators in these contexts (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998).

17. Practical implications

Despite the preliminary nature of our research and occasionally mixed results, we believe this work holds some important practical implications, several potentially troubling. First, although our research suggests that intersecting categories may help lesbian negotiators avoid some of the challenges faced by straight women in negotiation, it also suggests that gay men suffer from a distinct disadvantage. Second, our work reinforces the finding that women who are not perceived as homosexual—be they heterosexual or homosexual but not perceived as such—also suffer a negotiating disadvantage. Third, and most generally, our research suggests that stereotypes associated with both gender and sexual orientation continue to play a decisive role at the bargaining table—a troubling finding on its own given an increasingly diverse workforce. At a minimum, our findings suggest that negotiation courses alluding to the disadvantages of women and advantages of men at the bargaining table should be revised to account for sexual orientation. Additionally, and as noted, it is possible that gay men receive backlash for dominance displays. Thus, it may be that negotiation training should really target problematic stereotypes about dominance by group rather than providing particular negotiation skills/trainings for men or women. Finally, negotiators themselves may wish to consider the wisdom of the stereotypes they are using to judge their counterparts—and anticipate the potential stereotypes used to judge them. A greater awareness of stereotypes could lead to better outcomes and less prejudicial behavior at the same time.

18. Conclusion

Our research breaks new ground by challenging well-established findings from the literature on gender and negotiations—particularly that women generally underperform men. By integrating research on MOSAIC theory, intersectional invisibility theory, and mismatching in negotiation, we suggest that this pattern may reverse for both lesbian women and gay men. Specifically, lesbian women may achieve better-than-expected negotiation outcomes, whereas gay men may achieve worse. Taken together, our findings suggest that an intersectional perspective may offer a sharper lens for understanding the effects of gender, sexual orientation, and other important social identities in negotiation.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Sreedhari D. Desai: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Data curation, Writing – original draft. **Brian C. Gunia:** Writing – review & editing, Software, Methodology.

[9] We thank an anonymous reviewer for this astute observation.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2023.104279.

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